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"THIS RIGHT IS NOT ALLOWED BY GOVERNMENTS
THAT ARE AFRAID OF THE PEOPLE": THE PUBLIC
MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT WHEN THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS RATIFIED
Clayton E. Cramer,* Nicholas J Johnson,- and George A. Mocsary***
INTRODUCTION
The lingering question following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller' is whether the Court will employ the Four-
teenth Amendment to incorporate the newly confirmed right to keep and
bear arms as a limitation on states.2 The answer will hinge substantially on
the Court's assessment of the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with regard to the right to keep and bear arms. Discerning such intent
requires detailed evaluation of the context within which the amendment
emerged and the understanding of the right to keep and bear arms at the
time.
This is a historical assessment that poses a threshold methodological
question. Whose views on these matters should we credit? Should we privi-
lege the drafters, the signers, opinions expressed in newspaper accounts?
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1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2 Immediately on the heels of Heller, plaintiffs filed claims challenging state and local laws that
plausibly infringed on the right to keep and bear arms. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 25-27, Nat'l Rifle
Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Vill. of Oak Park, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. grantedsub nom. McDonald
v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009) (mem.) (No. 08-1521). These claims raise a variety of issues and im-
plicate a range of interpretative methodologies and perspectives. Michael Kent Curtis offers a rich
summary of the multiple perspectives from which we might draw answers in The Bill of Rights and the
States Revisited After Heller, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1448-50 (2009).
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The predominant originalist theory today is original public meaning.'
"Theories of original public meaning, in contrast to original intent, interpret
the Constitution according to how the words of the document would have
been understood by a competent and reasonable speaker of the language at
the time of the document's enactment."4 This Essay adopts that methodolo-
gy.
Assessing the constitutional right to arms in the context of the Four-
teenth Amendment is different from assessing it purely as a matter of
Second Amendment originalism. Things change. Cultures evolve. When
those changes lead to modifications of governing political documents, our
understanding of those documents must reflect the changed context. This is
not living constitutionalism wherein social change drives continuously
evolving conceptions of constitutional boundaries. Instead it is an acknowl-
edgment that the public understanding in 1866 of the right to arms protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment might be different from the public under-
standing in 1791 of that same right. The public meaning of 1866 is a fixed
point of reference that generates the interesting possibility that originalism
may give the Second Amendment one meaning when applied to the federal
government, and a different meaning when applied to the states, through the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Professor Akhil Reed Amar, for example, argues
that the right to keep and bear arms in 1791 was focused substantially on
the dangers of a strong standing army. By 1866, when the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment were proposing to extend the Bill of Rights to ap-
ply to the states, Amar argues, they "were hardly in the mood to rail against
a federal standing army; these men, after all, wanted to use precisely such
an army to reconstruct recalcitrant southern states. 6
[The] words "the right.., to keep and bear arms" take on a different coloration and nuance
when they are relabeled "privileges or immunities of citizens" rather than "the right of the
people," and when they are severed from their association with a well-regulated militia. To
recast the textual point as a historical one, the core applications and central meanings of the
right to keep and bear arms and other key rights were very different in 1866 than in 1789....
3 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751, 761 (2009).
4 id.
5 See also Josh Blackman & llya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora 's Box Sealed.- Privileges or Immuni-
ties, the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2010) (contending that originalism at the right time "demands that
the interpreter select the proper temporal location in which to seek the text's original public meaning.
... Federal protection against state encroachments on individual liberty began with the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 1868 is thus the proper temporal location for applying a whole host of
rights to the states, including the right that had earlier been codified as the Second Amendment as ap-
plied against the federal government. Interpreting the right to keep and bear arms as instantiated by the
Fourteenth Amendment-based on the original public meaning in 1791-thus yields an inaccurate
analysis.").
6 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 216 (1998).
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[W]e must first and foremost reflect on the meaning and the spirit of the amendment of 1866,
not the Bill of 1789.
7
This Essay pursues in detail the public meaning of the "right to keep and
bear arms" during the period leading up to enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It elaborates five broad categories of original public meaning.
Part I examines nineteenth century scholarly commentary and case law.
Part II examines popular understandings of the Second Amendment as the
militia declined in importance and the struggle over abolition of slavery
took center stage. Part III examines Civil War era claims about the meaning
of the Second Amendment. Part IV details how Reconstruction and the
Black Codes energized debate about the right to keep and bear arms. Part V
reviews the debate and enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it re-
lates to the constitutional right to arms.
1. BETWEEN THE RATIFICATIONS: ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT-COMMENTARY AND CASE LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
There is abundant evidence about the public understanding of the
Second Amendment between 1791 and the Civil War. Nearly all scholarly
commentary and most case law viewed the "right of the people" in the
Second Amendment to be an individual liberty,' like other constitutional
rights enjoyed by the people. There was something of a divide as to the
purpose of the right. Some articulated its purpose as resistance to tyranny-
a conception of the right that protected the option of political violence.
Even with this public purpose, the right was individual.' Others acknowl-
7 id. at 223.
8 Justice Scalia noted in Heller that "[w]e have found only one early 19th-century commentator
who clearly conditioned the right to keep and bear arms upon service in the militia-and he recognized
that the prevailing view was to the contrary." District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2807
(2008) (quoting BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 177 (Boston, Marsh,
Capen & Lyon 1832)). See also infra note 10.
9 The Supreme Court, in adopting the individual rights view of the Second Amendment while
acknowledging its tyranny-control purpose, effectively confirmed what scholars have been saying for
some time: that the Second Amendment's tyranny-control purpose was consistent with, and perhaps
even required, the individual ownership of arms. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798-99, 2801-02, 2805-07 (dis-
cussing how the tyranny-control aspects of the Second Amendment were served by individual rights
adopted by the Court); see also Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State:
Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1991)
(describing the adoption of the Second Amendment as a distinctly individual right, as opposed to a state
power, which often intersected with the Founders' concerns about tyranny); David B. Kopel, The
Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1362-70 (discussing a plethora
of nineteenth century commentaries and caselaw); George A. Mocsary, Note, Explaining Away the
Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second Amendment as a Nonindividual Right, 76
2010]
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edged the purpose of resisting tyranny, but explicitly recognized that the
right also included individual self-defense. With a few remarkable excep-
tions, none of the case law or commentary explicitly rejects the idea of a
right to arms for individual self-defense.
Most early constitutional commentaries articulate an individual right
to keep and bear arms. St. George Tucker's 1803 gloss on Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Rawle's 1829 A View of
the Constitution, and Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion of the United States present an individual right explicitly intended to
enable resistance to tyranny.'" This view reflects the expectation that the
people from whom the militia is drawn would appear bearing their own
private arms."
Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries lists the Second
Amendment, and contrasts the right it protects with the more limited guar-
antee of the English Bill of Rights of 1689: "[A]nd this without any qualifi-
cation as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British govern-
ment." 2
William Rawle's analysis is more detailed:
The corollary from the first position is, that the right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed.
The prohibition is general. No clause in the constitution could by any rule of con-
struction be conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. Such a flagitious at-
tempt could only be made under some general pretense by a state legislature. But if in any
blind pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed
to as a restraint on both.
FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2154-75 (2008) (analyzing the Second Amendment from a primarily founding-
era viewpoint assuming the tyranny-control model as its primary purpose, and concluding that
"[p]roperly understanding 'well regulated Militia' to refer to the armed and ready body of the people,
and considering the Founders' concern with tyranny, the Second Amendment can be translated into
modem parlance: 'Armed and ready citizens being necessary to prevent tyranny, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."').
10 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Heller, argued that "[t]here is not so much as a whisper in the
passage above that Story believed that the right secured by the Amendment bore any relation to private
use or possession of weapons for activities like hunting or personal self-defense." Id. at 2840 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The majority rejects this argument because Story equated the Second Amendment with
the "right to bear arms" in the English Bill of Rights, which in turn had nothing to do with militia ser-
vice and was clearly an individual right. Id. at 2806-07 (majority opinion).
11 Pursuing the question in the modem era, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174 (1939), and recently in Heller, acknowledged this aspect of the individual right. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. at 2799-2800 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).
12 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 143-44 n.40.
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This right ought not, however, in any government, to be abused to the disturbance of
the public peace.1
3
Justice Story emphasizes that while the purpose is to allow the people to
rise up against a tyrannical government, this is a "right of the citizens," not
a right of the states, or of the militia:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium
of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance,
enable the people to resist and triumph over them.14
Rawle's commentary also adds a significant new dimension to this general
theme. He viewed the Second Amendment as a limitation not only on the
federal government, but also on the states. This amplifies the point that he
does not conceive of it as a state right. As discussed below, this aspect of
Rawle's view may have been a minority view, but it was hardly unique.
The one commentator of the period who argues against an individual
right for self-defense, Benjamin L. Oliver, still acknowledges that this is the
dominant understanding:
The provision of the constitution, declaring the right of the people to keep and bear arms, &c.
was probably intended to apply to the right of the people to bear arms for such purposes on-
ly, and not to prevent congress or the legislatures of the different states from enacting laws to
prevent the citizens from always going armed. A different construction however has been
given to it. 15
Oliver's objection to the individual right construction is evidently a point of
policy. He amplifies the primary point with a lengthy and passionate criti-
cism of the "common practice in some parts of the United States" of carry-
ing concealed deadly weapons. 6 "This cowardly and disgraceful practice, if
it is really unconstitutional to restrain it by law, ought to be discounte-
nanced by all persons who are actuated by proper feelings of humanity or a
just regard for the dictates of religion."7
13 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122-23
(Phila., H. C. Carey & 1. Lea 1825) (emphasis added).
14 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890, at
74647 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (citing RAWLE, supra note 13, at 122-23). Story's under-
standing of the Second Amendment must have been pretty close to that of Tucker's and Rawle's be-
cause his citation for that sentence are the pages cited in the previous footnote.
15 BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 177 (Boston, Marsh, Capen &
Lyon 1832) (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 177-79.
17 ld at 177 (emphasis added).
2010]
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A textbook on the U.S. Constitution published during this period arti-
culates the tyranny-control model (as well as the benefits of rapid response
to external attack). While not as explicit as other statements of the time, its
use of the term "citizens" suggests an individual right rather than a collec-
tive or state right to maintain a militia:
"ARTICLE 11 A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
§ 622. If citizens are allowed to keep and bear arms, it will be likely to operate as a check
upon their rulers, and restrain them from acts of tyranny and usurpation. The necessity of
maintaining a large standing army is also diminished by arming and disciplining the citizens
generally, so that they may be ready and qualified at any time, to defend the country in a
sudden emergency.' 8
From our modem perspective, the search for case law concerning the right
to arms during this period is curious. There is a dearth of federal gun con-
trol laws in the antebellum period. Except for the Militia Acts of 1792 and
1803, which required every "free white male citizen" between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five to own a gun, there were not many gun control
questions to litigate. 9 Consequently, there are very few federal court deci-
sions in this period that address the Second Amendment. In a few cases the
individual right to arms is referenced by comparison. For example, United
States v. Sheldon2° analogizes the right to arms to the First Amendment.
Sheldon was prosecuted for falsely reporting a court case, and fined for
contempt of court. Sheldon argued that the First Amendment protected his
freedom of expression. The Michigan Territorial Supreme Court ruled that
"[t]he constitution of the United States also grants to the citizen the right to
keep and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot be construed into
the right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his neighbor."2 In Johnson v.
Tompkins,2" Justice Henry Baldwin operating as a circuit judge acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff Johnson had a right to recapture a runaway slave in
Pennsylvania. In determining whether Johnson's tactics for reclaiming his
slave had broken Pennsylvania law, Baldwin listed several rights that John-
18 FURMAN SHEPPARD, THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT-BOOK 245 (Phila., Childs & Peterson 1855).
19 Militia Act of 1803, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 207 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 (2006)); Militia
Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35).
20 5 Blume Sup. Ct. Trans. 337 (Mich. 1829).
21 Id. at * 12 (emphasis added).
22 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416).
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son enjoyed under both the U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutions-including
a personal right to keep and bear arms.23
Legislation and litigation in the states is both more abundant and more
complex. In the period 1813 to 1840 there was a burst of state laws, primar-
ily in the Old Southwest, that either restricted concealed carry of deadly
weapons, or banned sale of certain knives and concealable handguns. One
result of these laws is a series of state high court decisions that attempted to
define the limits of the right to keep and bear arms. While most of these
decisions are limited to right to arms provisions in state constitutions, 25 a
number of them comment on the Second Amendment.
In 1842, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided a case that took a very
narrow view of the right to arms under both the Second Amendment and
the more restrictively-worded arms provision in the Arkansas Constitution.
Chief Justice Ringo and Associate Justice Dickinson issued separate opi-
nions that came to the same conclusion: the state's authority to prohibit
concealed carrying of deadly weapons did not violate the Second Amend-
ment. Ringo's opinion urged that the Second Amendment protected only a
ight of the "free white men of this State" to be armed "for the preservation
and defense of the State and her republican institutions. 26 While Ringo
appears to have assumed a right of individuals to keep arms appropriate for
militia duty, he was evidently hostile to the right to bear arms for self-
defense.27
It is difficult to determine which of Ringo's arguments apply only to
the Second Amendment, which apply to the Arkansas Constitution's more
narrow "for their common defence" arms guarantee, and how much to cre-
dit his advocacy of the collective rights theme. He moves from a nearly
sourceless claim of a collective right with respect to the Second Amend-
ment to an acknowledgement that "the militia, without arms, however well
disposed, might be unable to resist, successfully, the efforts of those who
should conspire to overthrow the established institutions of the country, or
subjugate their common liberties ... 2 This second statement seems to
acknowledge that the right to keep and bear arms limited the power of the
government to disarm the population. The right was limited: it "surely was
23 Id. at 850 (holding that both the Pennsylvania Constitution and Second Amendment's "right to
keep and bear arms" were personal rights enjoyed by Johnson).
24 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: DUELING,
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 2-3, 17-46 (1999) (discussing the cultural factors involved
in restricting deadly weapons).
25 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL
INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 71-87 (1994) (summa-
rizing most of these state supreme court decisions, as well as raising questions of causation that are
answered in CRAMER, supra note 24).
26 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 26-27 (1842).
27 See id. at 25.
28 Id. at 24-25.
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not designed to operate as an immunity to those who should so keep or bear
their arms as to injure or endanger the private rights of others, or in any
manner prejudice the common interests of society."29 Even if we ignore the
federalism context and glibly conclude that the Second Amendment pro-
tects a right to arms only for common defense (as the Arkansas Constitu-
tion's more narrow guarantee provided), we still come back to the defini-
tion of militia as constituting the people bearing their own private arms.
Associate Justice Dickinson's concurrence came to the same conclu-
sion, arguing that "[t]he militia constitutes the shield and defense for the
security of a free State; and to maintain that freedom unimpaired, arms and
the right to use them for that purpose are solely guaranteed."3° Dickinson
also appears to argue that there was no personal right of self-defense: "The
personal rights of the citizen are secured to him through the instrumentality
and agency of the constitution and laws of the country; and to them he must
appeal for the protection of his private rights and the redress of private inju-
ries."31 This is a remarkable claim-an assertion that the government could,
if it so chooses, criminalize self-defense even if such self-defense was ne-
cessary to prevent death. It is a fully Hobbesian view of the authority of the
state over individuals-in a nation predominately grounded on Lockean
principles.
Associate Justice Lacy dissented and urged an individual self-defense
right construction:
I cannot separate the political freedom of the State from the personal rights of its citizens.
They are indissolubly bound up together in the same great bond of union, and, to my mind,
they are incapable of division .... Among these rights, I hold, is the privilege of the people
to keep and bear their private arms for the necessary defense of their person, habitation and
property, or for any useful or innocent purpose whatever. We derive this right from our An-
glo-Saxon ancestors, and under the form of that government it has ever been regarded as sa-
cred and inviolable. 3
2
None of these three opinions referenced any contemporaneous scholarly
commentary. The opinions reasoned instead from case law and the text of
arms provisions in other state constitutions (provisions that generally were
textually very different from the Second Amendment) and the Arkansas
Constitution's arms guarantee.
29 Id. at 25.
30 Id. at 32. (Dickinson, J., concurring).
31 id.
32 Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 42-43 (Lacy, J., dissenting). U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice James
Wilson discussed the somewhat similar statement of the Anglo-Saxon origin of the right of bearing arms
with respect to self-defense and the arms guarantee in the 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 JAMES
WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 84 (Bird Wilson, ed., Phila., Bron-
son & Chauncey 1804).
[VOL. 17:3
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State v. Buzzard33 is widely cited after the Civil War by courts attempt-
ing to uphold weapons restrictions. This is not because Buzzard was the
mainstream view. Rather, it is because Buzzard is one of the few precedents
available to justify the postbellum laws aimed primarily at disarming
freedmen. 4
The vast majority of the antebellum decisions recognize an individual
right to bear arms at least in part for self-defense, and fall into one of three
categories: (1) the Second Amendment applies only to the federal govern-
ment-although these decisions either explicitly or implicitly treat it as an
individual right, (2) the state constitutional guarantee in question limits
(although does not completely block) the authority of the state to regulate
the bearing of arms, and (3) the Second Amendment or the state constitu-
tional guarantee in question does not apply to blacks.
State v. Newsom35 illustrates the first and third themes. Elijah Newsom
challenged his conviction under a state law requiring free blacks to have a
license to possess deadly weapons. Newsom's appeal argued that such a
law violated the Second Amendment and the North Carolina Constitution's
similar guarantee of an individual right. Newsom, a free black man, had
been convicted of carrying a shotgun without a license. The North Carolina
Supreme Court had already recognized that the state constitution protected
an individual right to keep and bear arms.36
The court disposed of the Second Amendment question by asserting
that "[t]he limitations of power, contained in it and expressed in general
terms, are necessarily confined to the General Government. 37 Citing Bar-
ron v. Baltimore,3" the court explained that "[i]n Article II of the amended
Constitution the States are neither mentioned nor referred to. It is, therefore,
only restrictive of the powers of the Federal Government."39 The court dis-
missed Newsom's parallel claim with respect to the North Carolina Consti-
tutional arms guarantee. The court did not dispute that the North Carolina
provision protected an individual right. It simply argued that this right be-
longed only to white people.'
33 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
34 See CRAMER, supra note 25, at 97-164, for an overview of postbellum arms decisions in state
and federal courts.
35 27 N.C. 250 (1844).
36 State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. 418, 422-23 (1843) (upholding a conviction for the common law
crime of "riding or going armed with unusual and dangerous weapons, to the terror of the people" in a
case that might today be prosecuted for brandishing a firearm or assault with a deadly weapon).
37 Newsom, 27 N.C. at *251.
38 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
39 Newsom, 27 N.C. at *251.
40 Id. at *253-54. "The defendant is not indicted for carrying arms in defence of the State, nor
does the act of 1840 prohibit him from so doing. Its only object is to preserve the peace and safety of the
community from being disturbed by an indiscriminate use, on ordinary occasions, by free men of color,
2010]
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The second general theme of the state cases embraces Rawle's view of
the Second Amendment as a limit on state power. For example, in Nunn v.
State,4 Georgia's Supreme Court upheld a ban on concealed carry of deadly
weapons, but struck down a ban on sales of concealable handguns. The
court ruled that the Second Amendment protected open carry against both
federal and state restrictions.4"
Chief Justice Lumpkin's decision was part of a broader objection to
Barron v. Baltimore's decision that the first eight amendments limited only
the federal government. It was a position that was contrary to Supreme
Court precedent, but it was based on disagreement with the Court, not ig-
norance.43 As we will see shortly, other state high courts believed that the
Second Amendment protected an individual right against state encroach-
ment.
Another aspect of Lumpkin's decision in Nunn helps illustrate the
range of opinions about the nature of the right protected by the Second
Amendment. At one point, he articulates a right that extends broadly to "the
people."
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to
keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall
not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree .... .4
But within a few paragraphs, he shifts to a focus on citizens and how legis-
lation may not "deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of
his constitutional right to keep and bear arms."45
The implications of the distinction between a right of the people and a
right of citizens are evident. Two years after Nunn, in Cooper v. Savan-
nah,46 the Supreme Court of Georgia confronted the question of what rights
blacks enjoyed under the Georgia Constitution. The court ruled that "[firee
persons of color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are not
entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or to hold any
civil office."47 The court recognized a right to arms rooted in the Georgia
of fire arms or other arms of an offensive character. Self preservation is the first law of nations, as it is
of individuals." Id.
41 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
42 Id. at 251.
43 AMAR, supra note 6, at 153-56 (showing that a contrarian argument that the Bill of Rights
represented a common law tradition appears not only in Nunn, and Lumpkin's Campbell v. State, II Ga.
353 (1852), but also in the plaintiff's arguments in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540 (1840), arguing that
Barron was wrongly decided).
44 Nunn, I Ga. at 250-51.45 Id. at 25 1.
46 4 Ga. 68 (1848).
47 Id. at 72. Either this ordinance, or a very similar predecessor, was the basis for A Fact,
LIBERATOR, Mar. 26, 1831, at 51, to suggest that a Massachusetts free black citizen can move to Savan-
[VOL. 17:3
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Constitution and the Second Amendment that extended to "old and young,
men, women and boys." '48 The right was decidedly individual said the court.
But it did not extend to blacks.
The view of the Second Amendment as an individual right restricting
state law is amplified by three decisions from the Louisiana Supreme Court
handed down in the 1850s. In State v. Chandler49 the court ruled that the
Second Amendment was a limitation on state legislation. 0 At that time
there was no right to arms provision in the Louisiana Constitution. The
statute ultimately survived the challenge because it only prohibited con-
cealed carry:
It interfered with no man's right to carry arms (to use its own words) "in full open view,"
which places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of them-
selves, if necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and un-
manly assassination.
52
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions in 1856 and 1858 took similar posi-
tions. The first, Smith v. State,53 involved a challenge to Louisiana's ban on
concealed weapons based on the claim that a pistol in the pocket was only
partially concealed, and was therefore protected by the Second Amend-
ment. 4 The court held that the concealed weapon statute applied to any
weapon that was not fully exposed:
The statute against carrying concealed weapons does not contravene the second article of the
amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The arms there spoken of are such as
are bome by a people in war, or at least carried openly. The article explains itself. It is in
these words: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." This was never intended to
prevent the individual States from adopting such measures of police as might be necessary,
in order to protect the orderly and well disposed citizens from the treacherous use of wea-
pons not even designed for any purpose of public defence, and used most frequently by evil-
nah and challenge the statute as violating the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution, implying that certain rights were fundamental, and not simply a guarantee of equal
treatment for both residents and non-residents.
48 Nunn, I Ga. at 251.
49 5 La. Ann. 489-91 (1850).
50 Id. at 490.
51 Louisiana adopted its first arms-bearing constitutional provision in 1879. Nicholas J. Johnson,
A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715,
742 & n. 143 (2005). By 2003, a total of forty-four state constitutions had arms-bearing provisions. Id. at
724.
52 Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489-90.
53 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856).
14 Id. at 633.
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disposed men who seek an advantage over their antagonists, in the disturbances and breaches
of the peace which they arc prone to provoke.
55
The message of Smith is moderately contestable because of the reference to
arms borne in war.56 But that ambiguity is resolved by its position in se-
quence between Chandler (which is unequivocal on the individual nature of
the right) and State v. Jumel.7 In Jumel, the defendant challenged his con-
viction for carrying a concealed weapon both based on the statute of limita-
tions (more than six months had elapsed between the offense and being
charged), and that the Second Amendment protected his carrying of a wea-
pon." The primary question was not the nature of the Second Amendment
right but its boundaries. Recognizing that some regulation of the individual
right was necessary to public safety, the court held "[t]he statute in question
does not infringe the right of the people to keep or bear arms. It is a meas-
ure of police [regulation], prohibiting only a particular mode of bearing
arms which is found dangerous to the peace of society."59
The right articulated in these cases is not unlimited. Legislatures might
restrict individuals from carrying concealed weapons, but laws that prohi-
bited open carry faced a much more stringent burden. The type of weapons
protected trends more toward weapons used in warfare, as contrasted with
the treacherous tools of "unmanly assignation." But the focus on arms pri-
vately held shows that the right was conceived as individual in nature.
The last of the antebellum decisions to express an opinion concerning
the Second Amendment is the 1859 decision by the Supreme Court of Tex-
as in Cockrum v. State.' There, the court upheld a sentence enhancement of
life in solitary for manslaughter committed with a Bowie knife.61 Because
the sentence enhancement keyed on a cheap and common class of weapon,
counsel argued it was a form of class discrimination,62 and that the "right of
bearing arms" (though not the right to use them for manslaughter) was pro-
tected by both the Second Amendment and the Texas Constitution's arms
55 Id.
56 In arguments about the original meaning of the Second Amendment, Justice Stevens' dissent in
Heller argued that bearing arms has a particularly military connotation that supports a purely collective
or state right interpretation of the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2827-28 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the Louisiana Supreme Court's addition "or at least
carried openly" undercuts that view. Smith, II La. Ann. at 634; see also Cramer & Olson, supra note *,
at 517-19 (destroying the claim that "bear arms" has a particularly military connotation).
57 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858).
58 Id. at 399-400.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 24 Tex. 394 (1859).
61 Id. at 395-96.
62 Id. ("A common butcher-knife, which costs not more than half a dollar, comes within the de-
scription given of a bowie-knife or dagger, being very frequently worn on the person. To prohibit such a
weapon, is substantially to take away the right of bearing arms, from him who has not money enough to
buy a gun or a pistol.").
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guarantee.63 The court's discussion of the Second Amendment claim ap-
pears to recognize both an individual right for the purposes of tyranny con-
trol, and arguably, a collective view of the right:
The object of the clause first cited, has reference to the perpetuation of free government, and
is based on the idea, that the people cannot be effectually oppressed and enslaved, who are
not first disarmed. The clause cited in our bill of rights, has the same broad object in relation
to the government, and in addition thereto, secures a personal right to the citizen. The right of
a citizen to bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or the State, is absolute. 64
The court was clearly uncomfortable with the nature of the weapon-
ascribing capabilities to Bowie knives that bear a striking similarity to cur-
rent concerns about scary-looking semiautomatic weapons. And yet, they
acknowledged the right to carry such weapons:
The right to carry a bowie-knife for lawful defense is secured, and must be admitted. It is an
exceeding destructive weapon. It is difficult to defend against it, by any degree of bravery, or
any amount of skill. The gun or pistol may miss its aim, and when discharged, its dangerous
character is lost, or diminished at least. The sword may be parried. With these weapons men
fight for the sake of the combat, to satisfy the laws of honor, not necessarily with the inten-
tion to kill, or with a certainty of killing, when the intention exists. The bowie-knife differs
from these in its device and design; it is the instrument of almost certain death.
65
On the question of the Second Amendment, Cockrum poses the perpetual
question that plagues militia-centered conceptions of the Second Amend-
ment: do references to collective defense, tyranny control, or political vi-
olence, necessarily mean that the guns borne for these political aims are to
be "kept" only by the state? Note that their claim would be that this is about
state governments resisting the national government's tyranny. Also this
point launches us down the slope of how many citizens are needed to stage
legitimate political violence. Or shall the arms be kept by individuals, who
when called for militia service shall appear bearing arms provided by them-
selves in common use at the time?66
If the Second Amendment protected a purely collective right, or an in-
dividual right subject to governmental control over the militia 67 the Su-
preme Court of Texas should have flatly dismissed Cockrum's Second
Amendment claim: he was not armed with a butcher knife, nor did he kill
another person, as part of militia duty. The court's failure to dismiss the
argument suggests several aspects of how the court understood the Second
Amendment. The Second Amendment limited state authority to regulate the
63 Id. at 396.
64 Id. at 401.
65 Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
66 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815 (2008); see also United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
67 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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bearing of arms-and not limited to bearing arms as part of a militia. The
precise nature of that right is left open.
Once it is decided that the Second Amendment applies to the state, the
pure collective rights view seems untenable. The reason is structural: the
collective rights argument is essentially a claim about the federalist bargain
at the core of our Constitution. It asserts that the Second Amendment simp-
ly prevents the federal government from disarming state militias. That view
(rejected by Heller) only makes sense in the context of a dispute about fed-
eral power. When applied to the states, the collective rights theory devolves
into nonsense-a view that the Second Amendment prohibits the state from
infringing on the state's own right to arm the state's own militia.
The scholarly commentary and judicial decisions of the antebellum pe-
riod demonstrate that Americans recognized at least two different, not nec-
essarily exclusive, purposes for the Second Amendment. One objective was
to protect an individual right to preserve the potential for collective political
violence, so that "being armed, they may as a body rise up to defend their
just rights, and compel their rulers to respect the laws."68 The other purpose
was private self-defense-protection within the boundaries of what the
Louisiana Supreme Court called "a manly and noble defence of them-
selves."69
II. POPULAR UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
ABOLITIONISM, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACT, AND BLEEDING KANSAS
Judges are not the only, and perhaps not even the primary, sources of
information about the public understanding of the right to bear arms at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a variety of contexts, public officials
and private citizens in the nineteenth century discuss and describe the con-
stitutional right to arms in predominately individual terms. Both the politi-
cal violence/tyranny-control and private self-defense purposes continued to
be advanced. However, consistent with Akil Amar's surmise, articulation of
the political violence purpose diminishes around the Civil War while pri-
vate self-defense rationales become dominant.
68 This is the Tennessee Supreme Court's explanation of the Tennessee Constitution's somewhat
more narrowly written arms guarantee in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 157 (1840). While
Aymette denied that the right to keep and bear arms protected an individual right to self-defense, this
decision was based on the more restrictive "for their common defence" language. TENN. CONST. of
1834, art. I, § 26.
69 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850). The Georgia and Louisiana Supreme Courts
found that the right was not unlimited; concealed carry could be regulated or prohibited-a position that
in the latter half of the nineteenth century became increasingly the norm. Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243, 250-
51 (1846); Smith v. State, II La. Ann. 633, 633 (1856); see also CRAMER, supra note 25, 141-64 (pro-
viding a detailed examination of the development of case law and constitutional provisions that usually
recognized that concealed carry could be regulated or even banned as long as open carry was allowed).
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Some articulated understandings of the Second Amendment in the first
part of the nineteenth century focus on the Amendment's public violence
purpose, because of the militia context in which they appear. Recall that
this purpose can be pursued either through an individual right (under the
traditional conception of militia as the people bearing their own private
arms) or arguably through a variety of collective rights theories where gov-
ernment has full control of all the arms. An 1832 report from the New York
adjutant-general, unsurprisingly, focuses on the tyranny control model.7" It
describes how unusual the U.S. militia system was compared to other coun-
tries:
In most other countries it is a practical rule of government to limit as much as possible the in-
fluence of all, who live under it, over its measures and movements, and to arm and discipline
such only as are in its pay and under its control. The spirit of our political organization, on
the other hand, is, by extending as far as possible the right of suffrage, to subject the meas-
ures and operations of government to the influence of the greatest possible number, and, by
arming and disciplining every citizen, to be prepared to sustain in all emergencies, by the
united force of the whole community, a system instituted for the benefit of the whole. 7'
As a consequence, the system required "that every citizen shall be armed,
and that he shall be instructed also in the use of arms."72 The report also
argued "it is doubted by the most sagacious observers whether our civil
liberties could be maintained for a length of time without the influence and
protection of a militia. '73 What made the militia "dangerous to the existence
of an arbitrary government, render it indispensable to the existence of
ours."74 Finally, the report draws the connection to the Second Amendment:
That this was the opinion of the original parties to the constitution of the United States, is
apparent from the second article of the amendments of that instrument, which assumes that"a well-regulated militia" is "necessary to the security of a free state," and declares that "the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;" showing that the militia was
designed by thoge who had the largest share in its institution, not merely as a support to the
public authority, but, in the last resort, as a protection to the people against the government
itself.75
Like Tucker, Rawle, Story, and Oliver, the adjutant-general saw the militia
system as a fundamental part of our government-something that could not
be excised without serious damage: "So intimately, indeed, are they all in-
70 SENATE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Vol. 1, Issue 4, at 2
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terwoven with each other, that the connexion which exists between them
could not be dissolved without impairing the strength of the whole fabric."76
As the century progressed, enthusiasm for and attention to the militia
system declined.77 At the same time, the declining legal status of free
blacks, and the growing abolition movement, prompts a robust articulation
of the Second Amendment as a guarantee of arms for private self-defense.
The struggle over the rights of free blacks, which grew along with the aboli-
tion movement,78 led to this 1838 complaint from black Ohioans about laws
that sought to prevent free blacks from entering the state:
Nor were the projectors of this measure satisfied with casting them out beyond the protection
of law, and depriving them of the means of obtaining a lawful subsistence; but they made it
the duty of the officers of townships to remove them by force out of the state, for disobe-
dience to these laws. By the same process of legislation, every right secured by the constitu-
tion may be taken from the citizens of the state. The right of suffrage, the right to bear arms,
the right of the people to assemble together and consult for the common good; the right to
speak, write, and print upon any subject, might be trammeled with such conditions, as to
preclude their free exercise by a large portion of the citizens to whom they arc secured. There
is no greater security given for the right of suffrage, to those who now enjoy it, by the consti-
tution, than is given to all men of acquiring and protecting property, pursuing happiness and
safety, and of enjoying personal liberty. The constitution was formed with a full knowledge
that our population was comprised of white and colored persons.79
To this point, the complaint gives no basis for determining whether "the
constitution" was that of Ohio, or of the United States. But the following
sentences clarify that they are appealing to the U.S. Constitution-and mak-
ing an argument that resonates with views decades later that the aim of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn Dred Scott v. Sandford:."
The rights and privileges of the one class were as clearly defined and settled, and as sacredly
secured, as the other, by that instrument. The discrimination was distinctly made and ex-
pressed in unequivocal terms, whenever it was intended to confer any political privilege upon
the one, from which the other was to be excluded. But these laws are not only repugnant to
the constitution of this state, and to the principles of our free institutions, they are also in di-
rect contravention of the constitution of the United States. That document declares, that 'the
citizens of each shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states....' Was it not intended to secure to all the citizens, in each state, the right of ingress
and egress to and from them, and the privileges of trade, commerce, and employment in
76 ADJUTANT-GENERAL REPORT, supra note 70, at 2.
77 Militia Act of 1862, ch. 201, 12 Stat. 597 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 (2006)). See
generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 1-13 (1975) (examining in detail the decline of
the militia system).
78 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, BLACK DEMOGRAPHIC DATA, 1790-1860: A SOURCEBOOK 32-34,
43-49, (1997) (discussing Old Northwest immigration restrictions and "slave-dumping"); STEPHEN
MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN THE OLD NORTHWEST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 15-18 (1993).
79 Unconstitutional Laws of Ohio, LIBERATOR, Apr. 6, 1838, at 53 (emphasis added).
80 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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them, of acquiring and holding property, and sustaining and defending life and liberty in any
state in the Union? Does it not form one of the conditions of our national compact? 8'
Later that year, The Liberator advances again the view that the Bill of
Rights is a limitation on state laws, and explicitly ties these rights to the"privileges and immunities" clause:
However, you must leave him by virtue of others, a few other incidentals, such as compul-
sory process for calling in all witnesses for him, of whatever color,- the inviolate right to be
secure in person, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; right
of trial by jury in all cases over $20 value; the free exercise of religion, of speech, of the
press, of peaceable assembly and of petition; the civil rights of republican government,
which is guarantied to him in every State in this Union; the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in every State .... 82
The reference to "right of trial by jury in all cases over $20 value" and "civ-
il rights of republican government" suggests that the editorial writer is in-
voking the U.S. Constitution, not a state constitution. The quotation of the
U.S. Constitution's Article IV, Section 2 "privileges and immunities in
every State" leaves no doubt. 3 He continues with a claim to habeas corpus
and then invokes the right to bear arms this way. "We will mention one
more-that is the uninfringeable right to keep and bear arms." 4 A purely
linguistic assessment of this statement might claim that the reference to the
right to arms is still consistent with the political violence purpose of the
Second Amendment and thus is contestably collective in nature. In context,
as we will see, these are profoundly individual rights and individual self-
defense conceptions of the Second Amendment.
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 created a firestorm of popular upset.
Many Northerners had regarded slavery as a regional issue of little concern
to them. The new legal requirement to assist U.S. marshals in the capture of
runaway slaves, and the extraordinary fines for those assisting runaways, 5
injected the slavery question more directly into the lives and politics of
Northerners. As an idea and in application, the Fugitive Slave Act led to the
growth and increasing militancy of the abolition movement. Advocates of
nonviolent protest had long dominated The Liberator. Now, voices such as
Lysander Spooner's appeared, promoting more aggressive solutions.s6
Some of this advocacy explicitly invokes the Second Amendment in a style
that is hard to reconcile with a states' rights view:
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 The Claim of Property in Man, LIBERATOR, Sept. 21, 1838, at 149 (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter Claim of Property in Man]; see also Curtis, supra note 2, at 1449-50.
83 Claim of Property in Man, supra note 82, at 149.
84 Id.
85 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 7, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
86 E.g., Lysander Spooner, The Fugitive Slave Bill, LIBERATOR, Jan. 3, 1851, at 1.
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The constitution contemplates no such submission, on the part of the people, to the usurpa-
tions of the government, or to the lawless violence of its officers. On the contrary, it provides
that 'The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' This constitution-
al security for 'the right to keep and bear arms,' implies the right to use then--as much as a
constitutional security for the right to buy and keep food, would have implied the right to eat
it. The constitution, therefore, takes it for granted that, as the people have the right, they will
also have the sense to use arms, whenever the necessity of the case justifies it.
87
The New England Anti-Slavery Convention of 1853 articulated a similar
view about the individual protections of the Bill of Rights, including the
Second Amendment:
Then there were other provisions in the Constitution. They had personal guarantees of the
most express and liberal kind. Gentlemen had claimed, and he granted that the word 'per-
sons' was sometimes intended to cover slaves. But the same interpretation of words must go
all through any instrument which is subject to criticism; and so, if the word 'persons' was in-
tended to mean slaves, in the representation clause, then all the guaranties of personal liberty
given to 'persons' belong to slaves also. The people were guarantied the right to bear arms,
and, of course, by implication, to use them; they were guarantied the right to assemble peace-
ably; the right of free discussion; the right to hold property.88
The struggle in the South against abolitionism led to trials alleging treason.
As part of the political battle, in 1851, abolitionists reprinted St. George
Tucker's discussion of the differences between English and American stan-
dards for judging treason. It advances the Second Amendment as a personal
right:
The same author observes elsewhere: "The very use of weapons by such an assembly, with-
out the King's licence, unless in some lawful and special cases, carries a terror with it, and a
presumption of warlike force," &c. The bare circumstance of having arms, therefore, of it-
self, creates a presumption of warlike force in England, and may be given in evidence there
to prove quo animo the people are assembled. But ought that circumstance of itself to create
any such presumption in America, where the right to bear arms is recognised and secured in
the Constitution itsel? In many parts of the United States, a man no more thinks of going out
of his house, on any occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine
gentleman without his sword by his side."0
The fight for control over Kansas Territory by proslavery and aboli-
tionist factions soon led to barbarous attacks and deprivations of civil liber-
ties. As the crisis in Kansas Territory grew, speeches by politicians and
statements by ordinary citizens demonstrate that the Second Amendment
was widely understood to protect an individual right to not only possess
arms for self-defense but to carry them, and not dependent in any way on
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 The New England Anti-Slavery Convention, LIBERATOR, June 3, 1853, at 23 (emphasis added).
89 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 19, reprinted in Judge Tucker on the Law of Trea-
son, NAT'L ERA, Oct. 30, 1851, at 173 (fourth emphasis added).
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militia duty. Senator Charles Sumner's speech of May 19-20, 1856, claims
the Second Amendment as a decidedly individual right to be armed:
The rifle has ever been the companion of the pioneer, and, under God, his tutelary protector
against the red man and the beast of the forest. Never was this efficient weapon more needed
in just self-defence, than now in Kansas, and at least one article in our National Constitution
must be blotted out, before the complete right to it can in any way be impeached And yet,
such is the madness of the hour, that, in defiance of the solemn guaranty, embodied in the
Amendments of the Constitution, that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed" the people of Kansas have been arraigned for keeping and bearing them,
and the Senator from South Carolina has had the face to say openly, on this floor, that they
should be disarmed-of course, that the fanatics of Slavery, his allies and constituents, may
meet no impediment. Sir, the Senator is venerable with years. .. but neither his years, nor his
position, past or present, can give respectability to the demand he has made, or save him
from indignant condemnation, when, to compass the wretched purposes of a wretched cause,
he thus proposes to trample on one of the plainest provisions of constitutional libcrty. 9°
Bills proposed in Congress in June and July of 1856 reacting to the turmoil
of "Bleeding Kansas" included a guarantee that the Bill of Rights would be
respected in Kansas Territory. The list of rights in these bills corroborates
later claims about what rights the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
impose on the states. These lists also show that the "right to keep and bear
arms" along with other provisions of the Bill of Rights was understood as
an individual right:
And the people of said Territory shall be entitled to the right to keep and bear arms, to the li-
berty of speech and of the press, as defined in the constitution of the United States, and all
other rights of person or property thereby declared and as thereby defined.9'
The bill provides that no law shall be of force or enforced in the Territory infringing the li-
berty of speech, or the liberty of the press, or the right of the people to bear arms, &c. 92
That inasmuch as the Constitution of the United States and the organic act of said Territory
has secured to the inhabitants thereof certain inalienable rights, of which they cannot be de-
prived by any legislative enactment, therefore no religious test shall ever be required as a qu-
alification to any office or public trust; no law shall be in force or enforced in said Territory
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition for the redress of grievances; the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized; nor
shall the rights of the people to keep and bear arms be infringed.9 3
90 Charles Sumner, United States Senator, Speech at the United States Senate (May 19-20, 1856),
in THE CRIME AGAINST KANSAS: THE APOLOGIES FOR THE CRIME 22-23 (1856) (emphasis added).
91 H.R. JOURNAL, 34th Cong. at 1126 (1st Sess. June 28, 1856) (emphasis added).
92 Thirty-Fourth Congress: First Session, NAT'L ERA, July 3, 1856, at 107 (emphasis added).
93 S. JOURNAL, 34th Cong. at 428-29 (1 st Sess. July 8, 1856) (emphasis added).
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In July 1856, The Liberator reprinted an article from the Alton, Illinois
Courier that invokes a constitutional right to bear arms without specific
reference to the Second Amendment. However, because the "great constitu-
tional right" is invoked in Kansas Territory which had no constitution the
reference is evidently to the Second Amendment:
The right to bear arms is a great constitutional right; in Kansas it is also a great necessity.
These thieves and murderers who pour over in armed bonds to molest us, say we must be
disarmed, and that Free-State settlers must not enter the Territory. 94
Similarly, an August 1, 1856, letter from abolitionist settlers who had been
arrested when entering Kansas includes a list of violations by the Territorial
government that seems drawn from the U.S. Bill of Rights. While they do
not explicitly reference the U.S. Constitution, because the letter refers to"quartering of soldiers in time of peace," and there was as yet no state con-
stitution in Kansas, the most plausible inference is that the claim invokes
the Federal Constitution:
As for the acts of a body elected by the people of Missouri, calling themselves a Territorial
Legislature of Kansas, which authorize 'abridging the freedom of speech or the press,' or the
right of the people 'peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances;' which authorize the destruction of printing presses, hotels, and private dwel-
lings; the plundering of the people of their horses, cattle, and other property; the sacking and
robbing of towns and their citizens; the murder of political opponents with impunity; the'quartering of soldiers in time of peace in homes without the consent of the owner's; the in-
fringement of the 'right of the people to keep and bear arms;' the violation of their right to
be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures;' the issuing of warrants without 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation;'
the requiring of excessive bail, the indictment of persons for high crimes, for the sole pur-
pose of prosecution, or of depriving them of their liberty and lives; these, and such as these,
who can dignify by the name of 'laws adopted in pursuance thereof.' 95
The following day, August 2, Free Soil Party Representative Edward Wade
of Ohio made the same argument in a speech in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives. He complained that "[t]he whole military force of the govern-
ment, is put in requisition by the slave democracy" and listed the Second
Amendment as one of the rights being infringed:
Second amendment. -"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
In this amendment the same spirit of liberty is developed, as was so apparent in the preced-
ing. The right to "keep and bear arms," is thus guarantied, in order that if the liberties of the
people should be assailed, the means for their defence should be in their own hands.
94 John B. Baldwin, Kansas ClosedAgainst Free-State Immigrants, LIBERATOR, Aug. 15, 1856, at
33.
95 C. Robinson, Letter from the State Prisoners, LIBERATOR, Aug. 1, 1856, at 122.
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But this right of the people of the United States, of which the free-state settlers of Kansas are
a part, has been torn from them by the treasonable violence of this ill-starred administration,
which is used as the mere pack-mule of the slave democracy.96
Wade's articulation of the infringement and the importance of protecting
the constitutional right to arms is incompatible with a states' rights view of
the Second Amendment.
A speech by Representative Giddings in the U.S. House on August 17,
1856, reprinted in The National Era, also describes violations of the Second
Amendment in Kansas Territory. Giddings describes a robustly individual
right with a focus on self-defense:
By the use and power of the army, [the President] has taken from the people of that Territo-
ry their arms; and when the citizens were thus left without the means of defence, they have
been set upon by ruffians, by Missouri Democrats, friends of the President, and robbed of
their property, their persons insulted, their dwellings burned, and in some instances individu-
als were murdered.
The second article in the amendments of our Federal Constitution declares that "the
right of the people to keep and hear arms shall not be infringed. " But in that Western Terri-
tory the Constitution is trampled upon by our army, acting under the President's orders; and
we are called on to give the President money to support the army, while thus engaged in
overthrowing the Constitution .... 97
Iowa Governor (and later, U.S. Senator) James W. Grimes's letter to Presi-
dent Pierce, August 28, 1856, concerning the antislavery citizens of Kansas,
echoes the private self-defense theme:
Citizenship has been virtually denied them. Their right to defend themselves and "to keep
and bear arms" has been infringed by the act of the Territorial officers, who have wrested
from them the means of defense, while putting weapons of offense into the hands of their
enemies. 98
This is an illuminating equation: by denying these immigrants the right to
arms for self-defense, territorial officials had virtually stripped them of citi-
zenship.
The Republican National Platform of 1856 makes a similar charge,
explicitly including the right to keep and bear arms in a list of individual
96 Slavery Question: Speech of Hon. Edward Wade, of Ohio: In the House of Representatives,
August 2, 1856, NAT'L ERA, Sept. 11, 1856, at 148 (emphasis omitted).
97 The Right of the People to Control the National Treasure: Speech of Mr. Giddings, on His
Motion, that the House of Representatives Adhere to Its Position on the Bill Making Appropriations for
the Support of the Army, NAT'L ERA, Aug. 28, 1856, at 140 (emphasis added).
98 WILLIAM SALTER, THE LIFE OF JAMES W. GRIMES 85 (N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1876).
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liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights that were being violated by terri-
torial officers:
[T]he dearest Constitutional rights of the people of Kansas have been fraudulently and vio-
lently taken away from them; their territory been invaded by an armed force; spurious and
pretended legislative, judicial and executive officers have been set over them, by whose
usurped authority, sustained by the military power of the Government, tyrannical and un-
constitutional laws have been enacted and enforced; the right of the people to keep and bear
arms has been infringed, test oaths of an extraordinary and entangling nature have been im-
posed as a condition of exercising the right of suffrage and holding office; the right of an ac-
cused person to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury has been denied; the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
search and seizure has been violated, and they have been deprived of life, liberty, and proper-
ty without due process of law; the press has been abridged .... 99
Some called for impeachment of President Pierce, on the grounds that he
had violated multiple provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the right of"peaceable citizens" to "keep and bear arms." The petition of impeachment
from citizens of Eariville, Illinois, is a good example. Importantly, this is a
collective enterprise where objections about the details and contestable mi-
nor claims (e.g., controversial claims of individual rights) might be filtered
out by the need for consensus on the primary message. So it is significant
that the Earlville citizens' petition reflects a distinctly individual rights un-
derstanding of the Second Amendment:
We, the undersigned, citizens of Earlville, and vicinity, La Salle County, State of Illinois, be-
lieving FRANKLIN PIERCE, President of the United States, to be guilty of high crimes and
misdemeanors: That he has, in the exercise of the functions of his office, trampled the Con-
stitution of the United States, which he has swom to support, under his feet, in many of its
most vital and essential provisions-to wit-That he, as commander-in-chief, has used the
military of the nation to destroy 'freedom of speech and of the press in Kansas'; to take from
peaceable citizens of that Territory the 'right to keep and bear arms '; to prevent the people
from 'peaceably assembling to petition the government for redress of grievances: That he has'quartered soldiers, in time of peace, in houses, without consent of the owners:' That he has
caused the arrest of peaceable citizens for a political object, and without 'probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation': That he has violated the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures:'
100
Senator William H. Seward of New York sought the Republican nomi-
nation for President in 1856, and later served as Secretary of State under
Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. In an October 2, 1856,
speech in Detroit, he argued that the Constitution was not in fact a "pact
with the devil" as William Lloyd Garrison had claimed. Rather, Seward
argued, the Constitution actually had sought to abolish slavery:
99 B.F. MORRIS, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORRIS 314-15 (Cincinnati, Moore, Wilstach, Keys &
Overend 1856) (emphasis added).
10o Impeachment of Franklin Pierce, LIBERATOR, Aug. 22, 1856, at 140 (emphasis added).
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While they aimed at an ultimate extinction of that caste, and the class built upon it, by autho-
rizing Congress to prohibit the importation of "persons" who were slaves after 1808, and to
tax it severely in the mean time, and while they necessarily left to the individual States the
management of the domestic relations of all classes and castes existing therein, they especial-
ly declared what should be the rights and relations of all "persons," so far as they were to be
affected by the action of the Federal Government which they were establishing.10'
Among the individual rights Seward claims were protected by the Constitu-
tion are the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition on bills of attainder and
ex post facto laws, and the individual right to arms:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public security shall require it." "No bill of attainder or ex post fac-
to law shall be passed."... "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed. " "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." They ordained "trial by
jury," prohibited "excessive bail and excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments,"
and "reserved to the States and to the people all the powers of Government not expressly de-
legated to the United States."' '
In November of 1856, a report concerning the arrest of a group of immi-
grants to Kansas Territory, and the seizure of their arms, included a letter to
the territorial governor asserting a right to bear arms:
All that we have to say is, that our mission to this Territory is entirely peaceful. We have no
organization, save a police organization for our own regulation and defence on the way; and,
coming in that spirit to this Territory, we claim the right of American citizens to hear arms
and to be exempt from unlawful search or seizure.)°
This is another case where the reference is not tied explicitly to the Second
Amendment. However, the claim is staked as a right of "American citi-
zens." Such a national claim seems less likely to be in reference to a state
constitutional guarantee and more likely to be the invocation of the Second
Amendment.
III. DISPARATE CLAIMS TO CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE RUN UP TO WAR AND
WARTIME
It was not just Republicans and abolitionists who invoked the Second
Amendment. In 1857, as the crisis over slavery grew, Mississippi Governor
McWillie sent a message to the legislature that called for vigilance and a
101 The Slaveholding Class Dominant in the Republic: Speech of William H. Seward at Detroit,
October 2, 1856, NAT'L ERA, Feb. 5, 1857, at 24.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
103 Official Dispatches Concerning the Arrest of Col. Eldridge's Party, NAT'L ERA, Nov. 6, 1856,
at 178 (emphasis added).
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willingness to fight to preserve the peculiar institution. Excerpted in The
Liberator, McWillie's address declares:
The North already has a large majority in the House of Representatives, a majority of two in
the Senate, and the power to elect the President; for that power they cannot want but for pur-
poses of aggression. In this view of the question, it is our duty to be prepared for any contin-
gency, never losing sight of that article of the Constitution of the United States which dec-
lares the axiomated truth that a 'well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' Our fathers
well understood, when they adopted this provision of the Constitution; the dangers to which
our institutions might be exposed, and thereby secured the means of safety. This, however, to
be available, must be accompanied by the courage and the will to use those arms when ne-
cessary against all enemies, either foreign or domestic. Our institutions are already protected
by the Constitution and by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, but as
Constitutions or decrees of courts have no self-executing power, it may yet be that the duty
will be forced upon us of standing to our arms in the maintenance of our just rights.'04
It is possible to read this as a states' rights claim. But the authority of the
states to train the militia under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
was not in dispute. Later in his address, McWillie employs language that
suggests an individual right with a political violence purpose-namely, the
armed people as a bulwark against tyranny:
Eternal vigilance and sacrifice is the price of liberty. No people ever have been great and
free, no people ever can be free, who are not military in their habits, and ever ready to defend
their institutions and their laws. We, as a people, enjoy the peculiar privilege of bearing
arms, and being the defenders of our own rights and liberties. If we should ever be deprived
of the one or lose the other, it will be because we are unworthy of them, and had not the cou-
rage to defend them.
105
If McWillie understood the Second Amendment purely as protecting the
right of states to organize militias to fight against federal tyranny, his con-
tention that the privilege of bearing arms extends to the people seems odd.
Indeed, given the State's claim of authority over the militia under Article 1,
Section 8, it seems misplaced. Moreover, since it is common for govern-
ments at various levels to have military capabilities, his reference to the"peculiar privilege of bearing arms" that "[w]e, as a people, enjoy" argues
that he is invoking an individual right conception of the Second Amend-
ment with a focus on its political violence purpose.
On the other side of the race question, Representative Wells of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, in his criticism of Dred Scott,
employs Chief Justice Taney's articulation of the rights of citizens to illu-
strate the fundamental rights of Americans and highlight the fundamental
injustice of the decision:
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Thank heaven! there are higher privileges embraced in this term, 'Citizen of the United
States,' than all that comes to; and it is of these privileges and rights that the colored man is
deprived, and it is of that deprivation he complains. I could find, sir, in that very Dred Scott
decision, an enumeration, by the Supreme Court itself, of the rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of the United States, but I will not occupy the time of the House in searching for it
now. Those rights are to bear arms, to meet in public assemblies, and various other rights
therein enumerated, entirely distinct from that class of simply political rights of which the
gentlemen speaks. Of all these, in the express terms of the decision, the colored man is de-
prived, as well as of those other rights to which I have already alluded.10
Wells' view is consistent with Republican sentiment at the time. In Decem-
ber of 1859, The National Era quoted the Republican platform as follows:
"Spurious and pretended Legislative, Judicial, and Executive officers have
been set over them by whose usurped authority, sustained by the military
power of the Government, tyrannical and unconstitutional laws have been
enacted and enforced; The rights of the people to keep and bear arms have
been infringed."'°7
Representative Orris S. Ferry, Republican of Connecticut, speaking
about the problem of slavery and the Constitution a few months later, ar-
gued that the Constitution was fundamentally a document "that breathed the
very spirit of freedom" and proceeded to list the Second Amendment right
to arms alongside a list of other individual rights as exemplars of that free-
dom such as freedoms of religion, press, assembly, petition, security from
unreasonable searches, from deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without
due process."'
Not all the evidence of the period suggests that the Second Amend-
ment protected an individual right. In Massachusetts, the struggle over what
rights blacks enjoyed led to legislative attempts to include black men in the
state militia. The primary conflict concerned the respective powers of the
state over its militia and the broad authority over the militia granted to the
federal government under Article 1, Section 8. The Federal Militia Act of
1792 declared that only white males were members of the militia."°9 One
response to this was F.W. Bird's pamphlet urging that blacks be allowed
into the state militia. In one place, Bird's tract employs an explicitly collec-
tive rights view of the Second Amendment:
"To keep and bear arms,"-not for self-defence, nor for "military instruction," not for"special service in keeping guard;" but as members of a "well regulated" [State] militia. This
106 Who Are American Citizens?, LIBERATOR, Jan. 21, 1859, at 10 (emphasis added).
107 The Republican Platform, NAT'L ERA, Dec. 22, 1859, at 203 (emphasis added).
108 Speech of Orris S. Ferry, of Connecticut, in the House of Representatives, February 10, 1860,
NAT'L ERA, Feb. 23, 1860, at 32 (emphasis added).
109 Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 (2006)).
2010]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 847 2009-2010
GEO. MASON L. REV.
was the very purpose of adopting this second amendment to the federal constitution-to put
this matter of the independence of the State militia beyond the domain of controversy .... 10
In the next paragraph, Bird confounds this view with the suggestion there
was some other right that the Second Amendment ought to protect. First, he
argues that the Massachusetts Constitution's guarantee of "the right of the
people to keep and bear arms for the common defence" means essentially
the same thing as the Second Amendment's guarantee."' Then he seems to
complain that neither right goes far enough in guaranteeing to citizens a
natural right of armed self-defense: "[T]his right is as sacred to colored
citizens as to white citizens; and it is a miserable evasion to tell them that
they have the natural right of self-defence against lawless violence. So have
savages and dogs.""' 2 This suggests that Bird viewed the Second Amend-
ment and the state constitution both as protecting only a state right to arms,
but viewed that result as unfortunate and unjust. The minor puzzle here is
how to make sense of his view of the state constitutional provision. What is
the utility of a state constitutional provision protecting the state militia from
interference by the state?
In the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, it was evident that
civil war was coming. In New York City, police seized weapons and am-
munition bound for Georgia. An editorial in the February 15, 1861, Demo-
cratic New York Herald invokes the Second Amendment as an individual
right:
But, whatever is coming, we are not yet under martial law and a military dictatorship;
and the right of the citizens of Georgia to have and to hold as many arms as they please is
clear and undoubted. The second amendment to the constitution was expressly adopted to
guarantee this right. It is in the following words:_"A well regulated militia being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed."1 3
On the same question, Representative Burnett of Kentucky complains in a
July 16, 1861, speech on the floor of the House that President Lincoln had"violated the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the
Constitution," stating with reference to the Second Amendment that "[this]
right has been infinged. Arms, the private property of citizens, have, upon
mere suspicion, been taken at the order of military commanders, and are
now withheld from the citizens, whose property they are, and whose rights
110 F.W. BIRD, REVIEW OF GoV. BANKS' VETO OF THE REVISED CODE 30 (Boston, John P. Jewett
& Co. 1860).
111 Id. (emphasis omitted).
112 Id.at30-31.
113 More Unconstitutional Violence of the New York Police, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 15, 1861, at 4
(emphasis omitted).
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have thus been violated."" 4 While another member of the House challenged
Burnett as to where this seizure of arms took place," 5 no one contested that
the Second Amendment protected an individual right to possess arms.
Once the war began, Northern Democrats continued to invoke the
Second Amendment's protection of an individual right. Clement Vallandig-
ham was a prominent Ohio Democrat before the Civil War. When hostili-
ties commenced, he continued to express Confederate sympathies. He was
tried in 1863 by a military commission,"t6 and eventually exiled from the
United States. In an August 2, 1862, speech at Dayton, he decried the loss
of the individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights:
These guarantees were not in the original Constitution, but demanded by the States and
the people, and added afterwards. They were added for fear some President might be elected
who would claim to have the power, if not expressly withheld by the Constitution. What are
they! Freedom of speech, of the press, peaceable assemblages, the right to keep and bear
arms, freedom from illegal arrest. Yet you have been told that we shall not be allowed to en-
joy these rights-that "executive orders" shall be issued against us-that men who represent
the voice of the people shall not be heard-that the press shall be muzzled, and men's mouths
gagged, and no censure or criticism of the acts of the President, or of the officials under him,
shall be permitted, under penalty of arrest and imprisonment; and, thus, that our personal and
political liberties shall be disregarded, and the Constitution trampled under foot. 17
At a mass meeting in Hamilton, Ohio, in March of 1863, Vallandigham
delivered a speech that decried the infringements of the individual right to
arms." 8 Quoting Col. Henry B. Carrington's General Order No. 15 (that no
one was to carry arms), Vallandigham railed:
"At this time -" at a time when Democrats are threatened with violence everywhere; when
mobs are happening every day, and Democratic presses destroyed; when secret societies are
being formed all over the country to stimulate to violence; when, at hotels and in depots, and
in railroad cars and on the street corners, Democrats are scowled at and menaced, a military
order coolly announces that it is unnecessary, impolitic, and dangerous to carry arms! And
who signs this order! "Henry B. Carrington, Colonel 18th U.S. Infantry, Commanding"-
114 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-51 (1861).
115 Id. at 15 1.
116 THE TRIAL OF HON. CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM, BY A MILITARY COMMISSION 10-12 (Cin-
cinnati, Rickey & Carroll 1863).
117 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, ADDRESSES, AND LE17ERS OF CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM 403
(N.Y., J. Walter & Co. 1864) (emphasis added). He reiterated the loss of individual rights in a later
speech. See id. at 473. Vallandigham, as early as July 17, 1861, indicated his intent to introduce bills to
enforce "the writ of habeas corpus" as well as protections of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Amendments. H.R. JOURNAL, 37th Cong., at 102 (Ist Sess. 1861). It is not clear whether this was a
genuine desire to add enforcing legislation for the Bill of Rights, or a satirical criticism of the Lincoln
administration's wartime measures. It does not appear from the House Journal's index that such bills
were ever introduced. Id. at 311.
118 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, ADDRESSES, AND LEFERS OF CLEMENT L. VALLANDIGHAM, supra
note 117, at 502-05.
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Commanding what! The 18th U.S. Infantry, or at most the United States forces of Indiana-
but not the people, the free white American citizens of American descent, not in the military
service. That is the extent of his authority, and no more. And now, sir, I hold in my hand a
general order also--an order binding on all military men and all civilians alike-on colonels
and generals and commanders-in-chief-State and Federal. (Applause.) Hear it:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." By order of the States
and people of the United States. George Washington, commanding. (Great cheering.)
That, sir, is General Order No. I-the Constitution of the United States. (Loud cheers.) Who
now is to be obeyed--Carrington or Washington!" 9
General Order No. 15 also prohibited sales of "arms, powder, lead, and
percussion caps. ' ' 2° Vallandigham continued:
Sir, the Constitutional right to keep and bear arms, carries with it the right to buy and sell
arms; and fire-arms are useless without powder, lead, and percussion caps. It is our right to
have them, and we mean to obey General Orders Nos. 1 [referring to the Second Amend-
ment] and 2 [referring to the Ohio Constitution's guarantee of a right to keep and bear arms],
instead of No. 15.121
Vallandigham's views were shared by many Northern Democrats, as well
as others who were sympathetic to slave owners. In January of 1864, Sena-
tor Garrett Davis of Kentucky introduced a resolution attacking the Lincoln
administration for subverting "in large portions of the loyal States, the free-
dom of speech, the freedom of the press, and free suffrage, the constitutions
and laws of the States and of the United States" and causing citizens "to be
tried and punished without law, in violation of the constitutional guarantee
to the citizen of his right to keep and bear arms, and of his rights of proper-
ty; it has forcibly deprived as well the loyal as the disloyal of both." '22 The
Democratic National Platform adopted in August, 1864, also complained
about the Lincoln administration's use of military authority in the north:
[T]hc subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection; the arbitrary mili-
tary arrest, imprisonment, trial and sentence of American citizens in States where civil law
exists in full force; the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press; the denial of the
right of asylum; the open and avowed disregard of State rights; the employment of unusual
test-oaths, and the interference with and denial of the right of the people to bear arms in
their defence .... 123
119 Id. at 503 (emphasis omitted).
120 Id. at 504.
121 Id.
122 S. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., at 53 (1st Sess. 1864) (emphasis added).
123 EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING
THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCrION 118 (Wash., Solomons & Chapman 2d ed. 1875) (1871) (emphasis
added).
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Similarly, S.S. Nicholas, a conservative Democrat, described the rights pro-
tected by the Constitution in a collection of essays published in 1865. He
listed the individual rights protected by the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. 124 Significantly, when he listed the Constitution's guarantee of a
"Republican form of government," he distinguished from the other rights
by explaining that it was guaranteed "to each State.' 25 This suggests that
Nicholas' inclusion of the Second Amendment in the list of individual
rights was not careless.
Republicans regarded the Democratic concerns about civil liberties
with considerable suspicion. An 1866 history of the overthrow of slavery
describes the concern:
Mr. Lincoln soon discovered "the enemy's programme," as he termed it; yet thoroughly
imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, he was slow to adopt the
strong measures indispensable to public safety.
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution to loyal citizens, such as freedom of the
press, freedom of speech, the right of trial by jury, the right to bear arms, were all claimed
by traitors in the North, even when used only to protect the notorious enemies of the Union
in the execution of their treasonable plans. 26
Rights in the context of civil war are tenuous as, for example, the passage
of the Test Act in Pennsylvania and Virginia's law requiring loyalty oaths
during the Revolution showed. 27 Also, some rights claims might be less
than principled, since the stage of civil discourse and debate had long
passed. On this basis, one might discount the complaints of Democrats and
Southern sympathizers about infringements of the individual right to arms.
However, the complaints about infringements of the individual right ranged
across the political spectrum. Democrats and Republicans, abolitionists and
slaveholders, in slave states and in free states, all invoked the Second
Amendment as an individual right. In the context of the time, this view is
entirely understandable. So it is fair to believe that their claims were ge-
nuine, that their understanding of the right was plausible, and that by the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was finally adopted, the individual rights
vision of the Second Amendment was broadly shared.
124 S.S. NICHOLAS, CONSERVATIVE ESSAYS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL 19-20 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott
& Co. 1865) (emphasis added).
125 Id. at20.
126 ISAAC N. ARNOLD, THE HISTORY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, AND THE OVERTHROW OF SLAVERY
702 (Chi., Clarke & Co., Publishers 1866) (emphasis added).
127 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF HOW AND WHY
GuNs BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE 44 (2006).
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IV. RECONSTRUCTION AND THE BLACK CODES
With the shooting war over and four million slaves now freed, it is no
surprise that support by Democrats for the right to keep and bear arms be-
came more selective. Representative Thaddeus Stevens got to the heart of
things: "When it was first proposed to free the slaves, and arm the blacks,
did not half the nation tremble? The prim conservatives, the snobs, and the
male waiting-maids in Congress, were in hysterics."' 28 This was not simply
objection to an abstract principle of legal equality for blacks; it was strongly
tied to fear of blacks with guns (a situation that has been recurrent through-
out American history, and the origin of many of America's first gun control
laws).'29 Senator Willard Saulsbury, a Delaware Democrat, expressed his
opposition to the presence of black soldiers in the post-war Regular Army:
"'What would be the effect,' he asked his fellow senators, 'if you were to
send negro regiments into the community in which I live to brandish their
swords and exhibit their pistols and their guns?"" 3
In the South particularly, white unease with the new situation led to
widespread fear. Myrta Lockett Avary's Dixie After the War contains a
chapter on "Secret Societies," which articulates white fears of bloodthirsty
freedmen, out to murder white men, in order to rape the white women.'
Many of the hearsay accounts involve armed blacks, engaging in wanton
murders, and negligent discharges of firearms.'32
Fear of black retribution for slavery provoked tremendous stress
among white Georgians in the summer of 1865: "Everywhere there were
vivid secondhand accounts of armed blacks drilling in nightly conclaves,
waiting only for the signal that would trigger a coordinated massacre some-
time during the Christmas holidays."'33 Similar fears soon appeared in the
Carolinas.'34 While no evidence was found that such uprisings were actually
planned, by November, the panic had spread to more than sixty counties
throughout the former Confederacy-largely in the states with the largest
128 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 103-04 (1965).
129 See generally Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
17 (1995).
130 BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE
MILITARY 47-51 (1986) (quoting Further Senate Debate on the Wilson Bill, in 3 BLACKS IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES: BASIC DOCUMENTS 19-20 (Morris J. MacGregor & Bernard C. Nalty
eds., 1977)).
131 MYRTA LOCKETr AVARY, DIXIE AFTER THE WAR: AN EXPOSITION OF SOCIAL CONDITIONS
EXISTING IN THE SOUTH, DURING THE TWELVE YEARS SUCCEEDING THE FALL OF RICHMOND 263-78
(1906).
132 id.
133 DAN T. CARTER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE FAILURE OF SELF-RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
SOUTH, 1865-1867, at 192 (1985).
134 Id. at 193.
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black populations.'35 These fears increasingly centered on organized black
rifle companies,'36 and not surprisingly, many whites began to see disarm-
ing the freedmen as necessary for their safety, or at least used this as a cov-
er for other motivations. An example is "[i]n the late summer of 1865 a
Summerton, South Carolina, vigilance committee agreed to disarm the
freedmen of the area because of the danger of insurrection."'37 A conserva-
tive planter, Warren Manning raised an unusual objection given the context,
but one that seems significant in terms of the quest for the public under-
standing of the Second Amendment. Manning argued that "some of his
slaves carried weapons for the protection of the plantation before the war,
and now these men had been 'made free and therefore had a right to carry
arms." 138 Manning's objection seems courageous as a general matter. That
he advanced it at all and in such basic and concise terms suggests that he
and his audience understood it to be part of the basic rights of men, at least
white men."'
White-dominated state governments that formed immediately after the
war rapidly began to form militias; their concern was that the federal troops
which occupied the region would be insufficient, or perhaps unwilling, to
protect whites from the feared insurrection of the freedmen. 4 ° In many cas-
es, militias formed without formal state recognition and began searching
black homes, confiscating the freedmen's firearms. 4' In Eufaula, Alabama,
a militia company was joined by federal troops in confiscating arms from
free blacks.'42
With the close of 1865, Union generals and Southern legislatures ad-
vanced conflicting statutes and orders attempting to govern freedmen's
access to arms. In November of 1865, Mississippi required all blacks "not
in the military service of the United States Government" to obtain a license
from the county's board of police to "keep or carry fire-arms of any kind, or
any ammunition, dirk, or bowie-knife.' '43 The same measure made it un-
lawful for "any white person" to "sell, lend, or give to any freedman, free
negro, or mulatto, any fire-arms, dirk, or bowie-knife, or ammunition."'" In
December of 1865, Alabama enacted an even more severe penalty-and
without any provision for the granting of a license.'45 In January of 1866,
135 Id. at 193-94.
136 Id. at 197-98.
137 id. at 199.
138 id.
139 See CARTER, supra note 133, at 199.
140 id. at 219-20.
141 Id. at 220.
142 id. at 219-20.
143 MCPHERSON, supra note 123, at 32.
144 id.
145 id. at 33.
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Florida passed a law that tracked the Mississippi restriction."4 It required all
blacks to obtain a license "to own, use, or keep in his possession or under
his control any bowie-knife, dirk, sword, fire-arms, or ammunition of any
kind. 147
The federal government responded with military orders countermand-
ing this discriminatory arms legislation. Commander of federal troops in
occupation, General Dan Sickles, issued an order on January 17, 1866, dec-
laring that "[t]he constitutional rights of all loyal and well-disposed inhabi-
tants to bear arms will not be infringed; nevertheless this shall not be con-
strued to sanction the unlawful practice of carrying concealed weapons, nor
to authorize any person to enter with arms on the premises of another
against his consent. "14 s
Federal treatment of the right to arms also was not color-coded, but it
was not blind to the reality of policing the peace. One order commanded:
"No one shall bear arms who has borne arms against the United States, un-
less he shall have taken the amnesty oath . . . within the time prescribed
therein. And no disorderly person, vagrant, or disturber of the peace, shall
be allowed to bear arms."'49 This was a "constitutional right," which citizens
could lose because of bad behavior.
While hostilities had formally ceased, the importance of the individual
right to arms was plain to black people. One month after "General Order
Confirming the Freedmen's Right to Arms," The Christian Recorder (pub-
lished by the African Methodist Episcopal Church) editorialized:
The Charleston (S.C.) Leader says: "We have several times alluded to the fact that the
Constitution of the United States, guaranties to every citizen the right to keep and bear arms.
Gen. Tilson, Assistant Commissioner, for Georgia, has issued a circular, in which he clearly
defines the right as follows: "IV. Article II. of the amendment to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, gives the people the right to bear arms, and states that this right, 'shall not be in-
fringed. 'Any person, white or black, may be disarmed, if convicted of making an improper
and dangerous use of weapons; but no military or civil officer has the right or authority to
disarm any class of people, thereby placing them at the mercy of others. All men, without the
distinction of color, have the right to keep arms to defend their homes, families or them-
selves." We arc glad to learn that Gen. Scott, Commissioner for this State, has given freed-
men to understand that they have as good a right to keep fire arms as any other citizens. The
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, and we will be governed by
that at present. 150
146 See id at 40.
147 id.
148 Id. at 36-37.
149 MCPHERSON, supra note 123, at 37.
150 Right to Bear Arms, CHRISTIAN RECORDER (Phila.), Feb. 24, 1866, at 1-2.
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V. THE MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT SURROUNDING DEBATE
AND ENACTMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Given the complex interrelationships between the factions involved,
some scholars suggest that there may not be a single meaning discemable
from the statements of the legislators who produced the Fourteenth
Amendment.'' Contemporary views about the nature of the constitutional
right to arms seem less complicated.'52 A variety of scholars have mined the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment for signals about contem-
porary views of the right to keep and bear arms.'53 Some of the strongest
statements of support for an individual rights interpretation come out of this
period. There is solid evidence that both supporters and opponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment viewed the Second Amendment as an individual
right-and in some cases, the opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment was
driven by fear that it would preclude the Black Code provisions from dis-
arming the freedmen.
The post-war Congress was well aware of the racially discriminatory
black codes that the Southern states were passing to maintain the status quo.
Senate debate of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau
Legislation shows that a central aim was to combat racially discriminatory
legislation in the Southern states, including laws and practices that dis-
armed freedmen. There are numerous indications in the period from the end
of the war to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment suggesting that
people who disagreed about many other things viewed the right to keep and
bear arms in the Federal Constitution as an individual right.
In 1865, The Thirty-Ninth Congress convened a joint House and Se-
nate Committee of Fifteen that would evaluate the plight of freedmen in the
151 See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 105-06 (1993). Michael Kent
Curtis explains that our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is beset by dueling theories that he
summarizes this way:
First, one can read Section I (and particularly the Privileges or Immunities Clause) as pro-
tecting both equality and basic liberties for Americans throughout the nation against state
denial or abridgement. Second, one can read Section I of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as simply, and only, prohibiting racial and similar caste discrimination in rights provided
by and revocable under-state law. By the first reading, all persons would have rights, for
example, to free speech and to bear arms (assuming, as I do, that the right was considered an
individual constitutional right of all citizens by 1868) and these rights or privileges would be
protected at least against state denial. By the second reading, a state could not take free
speech or the right to keep and bear arms away from African Americans if it granted the right
to whites. But it could abridge the right for both.
Curtis, supra note 2, at 1448-49 (footnote omitted).
152 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876, at 68-69 (1998).
153 See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and "The Constitutional
Right to Bear Arms ": Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
341,341-408 (1995); Kopel, supra note 9, at 1451-54, 1461-1506.
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South and eventually would draft the Fourteenth Amendment.154 The Com-
mittee of Fifteen, the Congress, and the nation would come to understand
that while the war was over, subjugation of black Americans was not.
Through enactment of Black Codes and private terror, southerners at-
tempted to continue slavery in a different form. These depredations in-
cluded peonage contracts, denial of the right to assembly, denial of access
to the courts, and the taking of private firearms through discriminatory leg-
islation or government sanctioned robbery. The denial of arms to freedmen
received substantial attention in the debates and conversation of the times.
Given the context, it should be no surprise that these conversations reflect
an individual rights view of the Second Amendment.55 The country had just
emerged from a tragic and horribly bloody episode of political violence of
the type that the states' rights view of the Second Amendment enables.
Abuses by southern state militias were one of the problems Republicans
were attempting to combat. A report in Harper's Weekly illustrates the situ-
ation, noting that the militia seized all of the firearms from the freedmen
and that the militia "commenced seizing arms in town and now the planta-
tions are ransacked .... The civil laws of this State do not and will not pro-
tect, but insist upon infringing their liberties." '156
The reaction of freedmen is not surprising. One petition to the Con-
gress in response to such deprivations invokes the Federal Constitution and
an understanding of the right to arms that cannot plausibly be construed as a
states' rights understanding:
We ask that, inasmuch as the Constitution of the United States explicitly declares that
the right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed-and the Constitution is the Supreme
law of the land-that the late efforts of the Legislature of this state to pass and act to deprive
us or [sic] arms be forbidden, as a plain violation of the Constitution.... "'
Debates over the Freedman's Bureau Bill show that even Southerners who
opposed extending full rights of citizenship to freedmen might agree that
the individual rights of Americans included "every man bearing his arms
about him and keeping them in this house, his castle, for his own de-
fense."'58 Similarly, the attack by Senator Saulsbury on the Civil Rights Bill
reflected an individual rights understanding of the federal protection:
154 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1865).
155 See AMAR, supra note 6, at 215-18. Fresh out of the Civil War, there was little advocacy for
any sort of states' rights conception of the Second Amendment-or any other states' right. Id.
156 The Labor Question at the South, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 1866, at 19.
157 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865, at 302 (Philip Sheldon Foner
& George E. Walker eds., 1980).
158 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis in opposition to the
Freedman's Bill).
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[T]here has existed a law of the State based upon and founded in its police power, which dec-
lares that free negroes shall not have the possession of fire-arms or ammunition. This bill
proposes to take away from the States this police power, so that if in any State of this Union
at anytime hereafter there shall be such a numerous body of dangerous persons belonging to
any distinct race as to endanger the peace of the State, and to cause the lives of its citizens to
be subject to their violence, the State shall not have the power to disarm them without dis-
arming the whole population. 59
Debate over the Civil Rights Bill reveals another aspect of the racial dy-
namic of the time that confirms the individual rights understanding. As the
debate progressed in the Senate, Senator George H. Williams from Oregon
worried that if the act extended the rights of citizens to Indians, it would
invalidate state laws prohibiting whites from selling guns to Indians."'6 This
was a period where the U.S. was still engaged in the conquest of Indian
tribes so it is no surprise that the Senate voted to exclude Indians "not
taxed" from the definition of citizens. 6'
Consideration of the Civil Rights Bill reflected a concern at many le-
vels about who was armed and under what authority. Northern congressmen
worried about disarmament of freedmen and noted that the right to arms
currently required protection through military orders of occupying federal
forces. One of those orders, issued by General D.E. Sickels, claimed to pro-
tect the "constitutional rights of all loyal and well disposed inhabitants to
bear arms."'' 62 It is not a reference to states, and under the circumstances
seems decidedly individual in character.
A report of the commissioner of the Kentucky Freedman's Bureau
elaborates the context and the individual right understanding in unequivocal
terms: "The civil law prohibits the colored man from bearing arms ....
Their arms are taken from them by the civil authorities .... Thus the right
of the people to keep and bear arms as provided in the constitution is in-
fringed.' 1
63
Congress reflected this concern explicitly in the Freedman's Bureau
Bill by providing military protection to those whose rights were violated
and left defenseless due to the interruptions of civil process caused by the
rebellion. Among those explicitly protected rights was "the constitutional
right of bearing arms."'"
The black press widely circulated General Order No. 1, General
Sickles' declaration that freedman, now citizens, enjoyed an individual
right to arms. The order was reprinted in the Loyal Georgian, accompanied
by a robust editorial on individual rights:
159 Id. at 478 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury against the Civil Rights Act).
160 Id. at 572-73 (statements of Sen. Williams).
161 Id. at 574-75.
162 Id. at 908-09 (statement of Sen. Wilson citing Sickles' order).
163 Id. at 657,2774.
164 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866).
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Editor Loyal Georgian: Have colored persons a right to own and carry fire arms? A Co-
lored Citizen.
[Editor:] Almost every day we arc asked questions similar to the above. We answer
certainly you have the same right to own and carry arms that other citizens have. You are not
only free but citizens of the United States and, as such, entitled to the same privileges granted
to other citizens by the Constitution of the United States....
Article II of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, gives the people
the right to bear arms and states that this right shall not be infringed. Any person, white or
black may be disarmed if convicted of making an improper or dangerous use of weapons, but
no military or civil officer has the right or authority to disarm any class of people, thereby
placing them at the mercy of others. All men, without distinction of color have the right to
keep and bear arms to defend their homes, families or themselves.1
65
Concern about infringement of the basic liberties of freedmen also prompt-
ed arguments for disbanding the militias of the rebel states. 66 Significantly,
this occurred consistent with arguments that the right to keep and bear arms
should be respected. The right in this context was an individual not a state
right. In February of 1866, Senator Wilson introduced a resolution to dis-
band militia forces in most southern states where militias had disarmed
freedmen. In the debate both supporters and opponents agreed that peaceful
citizens maintained a right to keep and bear arms.1 67 Wilson's bill ultimately
passed in a form that disbanded militias but maintained the right of individ-
uals to their private firearms.161
The threats and violence of the southern militias were palpable, but
other deprivations were subtler. In February of 1866 General Rufus Saxon,
former assistant commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in South Carolina,
testified before the Joint Committee about the use of peonage contracts that
deprived freedmen of basic rights including a right to arms. Saxon ex-
plained to the committee that white southerners "desired me to sanction a
form of contract which would deprive the colored men of their arms, which
I refused to do. The subject was so important, as I thought, to the welfare of
the freedmen that I issued a circular on this subject." '169 Saxon's circular
frames the right to arms in decidedly individual terms.
It is reported that in some parts of this State, armed parties are, without proper authority, en-
gaged in seizing all fire-arms found in the hands of the freedmen. Such conduct is in plain
and direct violation of their personal rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States, which declares that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
165 Letter to the Editor, LOYAL GEORGIAN (Augusta), Feb. 3, 1866, at 3.
166 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 914 (1866).
167 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1865).
168 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 135-42 (1984).
169 JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION AT THE FIRST SESSION THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS 219 (1866) [hereinafter
RECONSTRUCTION REPORT].
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fringed." The freedmen of South Carolina have show by their peaceful and orderly conduct
that they can safely be trusted with fire-arms, and they need them to kill game and for subsis-
tence, and to protect their crops for destruction by birds and animals.170
At the end of February 1866, the House began debating the proposed Four-
teenth Amendment. 71 Some objected that the amendment was unnecessary.
Senator Nye, for example, argued that the Bill of Rights already was "estab-
lished by the fundamental law . . . [and] that [no] state has the power to
subvert or impair the natural and personal rights of the citizen."' 7 On the
question of a right to arms he argued, that blacks "[a]s citizens of the Unit-
ed States ... [h]ave equal right to protection, and to keep and bear arms for
self-defense.' 73
Debate over provisions of the Civil Rights Bill in March 1866 refe-
renced language that parallels what we would come to know as the citizen-
ship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Explaining this proposal, Repre-
sentative Henry Raymond of New York declared:
Make the colored man a citizen of the United States and he has every right which you and 1
have as citizens of the United States under the laws and Constitution .... He has a defined
status; he has a country and a home; a right to defend himself and his wife and children; a
right to bear arms ... .74
True, Raymond separates the right of personal defense and the right to arms
with a semicolon. But this is far from endorsement of a states' rights argu-
ment. Raymond makes no mention of states or militias and in this context
the very prospect that Raymond was arguing for a collective right is im-
plausible.
Testimony before the Joint Committee of Fifteen in March of 1866
reminds us that the state militias were the source of infringement of a right
to arms that was understood as vested in individual freedmen. Major Gen-
eral Wager Sayne, assistant commissioner of the Freedman's Bureau in
Alabama, testified that militias "were ordered to disarm the freedmen" and
that when he learned of one order in particular, "[he] made public [his] de-
termination to maintain the right of the Negro to keep and to bear arms and
[his] disposition to send an armed force into any neighborhood in which
that right should be systematically interfered with.' 75
The statements of commanders such as Major General Sayne are im-
portant because they reflect broadly dispersed public announcements. Some
of the Congressional debates during this time are arguably more obscure
170 Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
171 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866).
172 Id. at 1072.
173 ld. at 1073.
174 Id. at 1266.
175 RECONSTRUCTION REPORT, supra note 169, at 140.
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(i.e., exchanges in the House or Senate). However, the thrust of those de-
bates is reflected strongly in the newspapers of the time. This is particularly
so for the vote to override Andrew Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Bill.
An April 1866 New York Evening Post editorial about the override vote
described the "mischiefs for which the Civil Rights Bill seeks to provide a
remedy."'76 Listed among their rights to public assembly and the right to
own property was "keeping fire-arms."' 77
By the end of April 1866, the Joint Committee of Fifteen reported its
proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment out to the congress and the debate
became public.'78 Introducing the proposed amendment to the Senate, Sena-
tor Howard explained the view of the Joint Committee that the "[g]reat ob-
ject of the first section of this amendment is therefore to restrain the power
of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamen-
tal guarantees."' 79 These guarantees he urged were the "personal rights
guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution"
including "the right to keep and bear arms."' 80 Howard's explanation was
widely reported in the press.181
In the summer of 1866, Congress voted to override Andrew Johnson's
veto of the second Freedman's Bureau Bill and to approve for ratification
the Fourteenth Amendment. Stephen Halbrook highlights that "[e]very
Senator who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment also voted for the
Freedmen's Bureau Bills."' 82 The Freedman's Bureau Act explicitly de-
clared that "the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and
enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district without respect to race or
color or previous condition of slavery."'83 The act extended military protec-
tion to and gave the military jurisdiction over questions concerning "the
free enjoyment of such immunities and rights."' 8
The right to arms discussed in the act, argues Halbrook, is squarely
within the privileges and immunities the Fourteenth Amendment was de-
signed to protect.'85 And that right, as the context shows, was anchored to
individuals. Not only is there no reference to militias or states' rights in the
Freedmen's Bureau Act, but it was states and militias who were the prin-
cipal violators of the rights the Act aimed to protect. As further evidence, as
the controversy over ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment swirled,
176 The Civil Rights Bill in the Senate, N.Y. EVENING POST, Apr. 7, 1866, at 2.
177 id.
178 BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 114-20 (1914).
179 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Scss. 2766 (1866).
180 ld. at2765.




185 Id. at 40-44.
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Congress passed legislation to abolish Southern state militias-the ultimate
repudiation of a states' rights view of the Second Amendment.'86 Senator
Wilson explained that the legislation was necessary because the state mili-
tias had been used "to disarm portions of the people," namely freedmen.'87
On first pass, the Fourteenth Amendment was unanimously rejected by
the Southern states. But chafing under federal military rule and the stipula-
tion that they could not reenter the Union unless they approved the
Amendment, the Southern states ultimately capitulated.'88 By 1868 the
Fourteenth Amendment was the law of the land. The evils it addressed, the
aims it pursued, and the context in which it arose show that the right to
arms that flowed with it was decidedly individual.
CONCLUSION
The nature and boundaries of the rights of citizens and the rights of
men were burning questions in the nineteenth century. They culminated in
war, reconstruction, and constitutional change that aimed to extend the
rights and privileges of American citizenship to those previously held in
bondage. The discussion and discord over the right to arms in this context
reveals that people all along the political spectrum held a decidedly indi-
vidual rights understanding. Those who supported the Fourteenth Amend-
ment frequently articulated that the freedmen, now citizens, enjoyed the
same right to keep and bear arms as others. Freedmen themselves claimed
and embraced the individual right. Even those who were committed to
stripping blacks of their new status considered the individual right to arms
an attribute of citizenship.
The description of the right from an 1872 school textbook elaborates
the point:
15. What are the rights which are secured to every individual by the Constitutions and laws
of the United States?
K. The right to keep and bear arms.'8 9
186 Id. at 68-69.
187 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1848 (1867).
188 See Proclamation of Ratification, 15 Stat. 708, 709-11 (1868).
189 CASPAR T. HOPKINS, A MANUAL OF AMERICAN IDEAS 49 (San Francisco, Bacon & Company
1872).
2010]
HeinOnline  -- 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 861 2009-2010
GEO. MASON L. REv.
Every individual throughout the nation has the Constitutional right to keep and bear arms.
This accustoms the people to their use. (This right is not allowed by governments that are
afraid of the people.) 19
190 Id. at 177-78.
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